Abstract: This paper assesses the implications for optimal discretionary monetary policy if the slope of the Phillips curve changes. The paper first derives a Phillips curve from the optimal pricing decision of a monopolistic firm that faces a changing cost of price adjustment. The second aspect of the paper constructs a utility-based welfare criterion. A novel feature of this criterion is that is has a relative weight on output gap deviations that changes synchronously with changes in the cost of price adjustment. The systematic component of the targeting rule that implements the optimal discretionary policy under the utility-based criteria is constant. In contrast, the systematic component of the targeting rule under an ad-hoc criteria changes along with changes in the slope of the Phillips curve.
Introduction
The slope of the Phillips curve is an important parameter in the minds of policymakers.
Empirical evidence suggests a 'flattening' of the Phillips curve in recent decades, indicating inflation has become less responsive to movements in measures of aggregate economic activity, such as the output gap.
1 Although this phenomenon appears using reduced-form estimation procedures, as in Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) , it also appears using structural approaches to estimation, as in Smets and Wouters (2007) . In the New Keynesian framework, the slope of the Phillips curve appears in targeting rules describing optimal monetary policy. Given these observations, this paper addresses two issues: (1) the derivation of a Phillips curve with a changing slope, driven by changes in the cost of price adjustment and (2) the implications for optimal discretionary monetary policy confronting this type of structural change.
The channel generating the change in the slope of the Phillips curve is a shift in the price setting friction for monopolistically competitive firms.
2 The microfoundations of the firm's price-setting problem are similar to Rotemberg (1982) , except the term governing the cost of price adjustment is subject to change over time. The equation describing the optimal price-setting behavior of the firm is similar to a standard forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve, except the coefficients on expected inflation and the output gap are subject to change.
In the presence of markup shocks, a central bank trying to stabilize inflation and output faces the Phillips curve as the constraint on achieving these objectives. Under discretion, the optimal targeting rule balances policy objectives by prescribing adjustments to the output gap in response to movements in inflation. The central bank adjusts the output gap aggressively if the relative weight on output gap fluctuations in its objective function is small or the slope coefficient on the output gap in the Phillips curve is large. If the slope of the Phillips curve changes, then the optimal targeting rule will also change under a loss function that has a constant relative weight on output gap deviations, such as a common ad-hoc loss function in squared deviations of inflation and the output gap.
A benefit, however, of deriving the Phillips curve under the potential for structural change is that it makes possible the derivation of a utility-based welfare criterion. In contrast to an ad-hoc loss function with a constant relative weight on output gap deviations, a central feature of the utility-based measure is that this weight depends on the slope of the Phillips curve, so changes when the slope of the Phillips curve shifts. The changing weight reflects that higher losses arise due to inflation in states with relatively high costs of price adjustment. Since inflation imposes higher costs on firms in states with relatively sticky prices, it is precisely in these states that monetary policy increases the relative weight on inflation stabilization. In contrast to the ad-hoc rule, the optimal targeting rule under the utility-based welfare criterion directs the central bank to have a constant systematic response to inflation. That is, the optimal targeting rule advocates a policy that consistently adjusts the output gap to the same extent in response to inflation, regardless of the slope of the Phillips curve. Blake and Zampolli (2006) , Moessner (2006) , Zampolli (2006) and Svensson and Williams (2007) also demonstrate how shifts in parameters governing private sector relations generate shifts in the central bank's targeting rule. This paper differs from this previous work in two respects. First, the Phillips curve relation with changing coefficients arises from a representative firm's optimal pricing problem. Moessner (2006) , Zampolli (2006) and Svensson and Williams (2007) study macroeconomic relations with changing parameters, but do not incorporate the potential for parameter change into the original optimization problems of households and firms. In this paper, the potential for structural change is built into the primitive optimization problem of the firm. The different approaches, however, stems partially from the different focus. For example, Svensson and Williams (2007) are specifically interested in model uncertainty and not with the mechanics generating shifts in the private sector relations. Second, this paper constructs a utility-based welfare criterion, instead of using an ad-hoc loss, to evaluate different monetary policies confronting shifts in the slope of the Phillips curve. Deriving the utility-based metric is possible because the microfoundations of the firm's pricing problem are made explicit.
The NK Phillips Curve Under Changing Costs of Price Adjustment
This section embeds state-dependent parameters into the optimal pricing problem of a monopolistically competitive firm. As in Rotemberg (1982) , the firm faces quadratic costs of price adjustment, except the term governing the magnitude of the cost is subject to change.
Introducing these changing costs into the pricing problem results in a Phillips curve relation with coefficients on the output gap and expected inflation that change over time.
Changing Costs of Price Adjustment
The Rotemberg (1982) formulation imposes a cost on monopolistic intermediate-goods producing firms for adjusting their price, given by
where ϕ ≥ 0 governs the magnitude of the price adjustment cost, Π denotes the gross steadystate rate of inflation and P t (j) denotes the nominal price set by firm j ∈ [0, 1]. 3 The cost is measured in terms of the final good Y t . The assumption of quadratic adjustment costs implies that firms change their price every period in the presence of shocks, but will adjust only partially towards the optimal price the firm would set in the absence of such costs. As with any type of quadratic adjustment cost, a firm prefers a sequence of small adjustments to very large adjustments in a given period. Alternatively, these costs may vary according to a state, s t , such as 
The Optimal Pricing Problem
Each of the monopolistically competitive intermediate-goods producing firms seek to maximize the expected present-value of profits,
where Δ t+s is the representative household's stochastic discount factor, D t (j) are nominal profits of firm j, and P t is the nominal aggregate price level. Also, firm j produces good j.
For given s t , real profits are
where Ψ t denotes real marginal cost and y t (j) = n t (j) is the production of intermediate goods by firm j using labor input n t (j).
There exists a final-goods producing firm that purchases the intermediate inputs at nominal prices P t (j) and combines them into a final good using the following constant-returnsto-scale technology
where θ t > 1 ∀ t is the elasticity of substitution between goods. Variations in θ t translate into markup shocks of the monopolistic firm's price over its marginal cost. The profitmaximization problem for the final-goods producing firm yields a demand for each intermediate good given by
For a given s t , substituting (4) and (6) into (3) then differentiating with respect to P t (j) yields the first-order condition
where an analogous condition exists for each s t .
In a symmetric equilibrium, every firm faces the same Ψ t and Y t , so the pricing decision is the same for all firms, implying P t (j) = P t . Also, steady-state inflation and output are constant across states. Steady-state marginal costs are given by
and Ψ −1 = μ, where μ is the steady-state markup of price over marginal cost. In the flexibleprice case, where
t (θ t − 1) and the markup is
To obtain a linear system the captures the firm's pricing decision, (7) is log-linearized conditional on each s t and expectations are written using the approach in Gordon and St-Amour (1999), Bansal and Zhou (2002) , and Davig and Leeper (2007) . This approach requires defining a smaller information set that excludes the current state, Ω 
which uses the state-contingent notation that defines π t = π it ⇔ s t = i for i = 1, 2. This notation simply indicates that inflation at t depends on the state at t, and not directly on past states (i.e. s t−i for i > 0). Similar notation applies to all other endogenous variables.
When taking expectations of variables written in state-contingent notation, let
Imposing symmetry and (8), a linear approximation to the firm's optimal price-setting equation can be written in terms of aggregate inflation using state-contingent notation as
and for s t = 2 as
where
and θ t = log(θ t /θ). 5 More generally, these expressions can be rewritten as
for i = 1, 2, which reduces to the constant-parameter specification when either ϕ i = ϕ for all i or p 11 = p 22 = 1. Equation (12) 
Households
To analyze the implications of instability in the Phillips curve in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting, this section gives the representative household's problem and optimality conditions. In a subsequent section, the households period-utility function forms the basis of the central bank's loss function.
The representative household chooses
to maximize lifetime utility
where C t is the composite good, H t = 1 0 h t (j)dj is time spent working, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Utility maximization is subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
where B t are nominal bond holdings, X t are real profits from ownership of firms, T t are lump-sum taxes, P t is the aggregate price level, W t is the nominal wage and Q t is the inverse of the gross nominal interest rate. Lump-sum taxes finance a constant employment subsidy, ν, which offsets the inefficiently low level of production in the steady-state arising from the monopolistic distortion. The subsidy is set equal to (1 + ν) = μ, which sets the flexibleprice steady-state level of output equal to the level that would prevail in the absence of the monopolistic distortion (i.e. the efficient level).
The household's first-order conditions are
In the previous section, the household discount factor is Δ t+s = (C t+s /C t ) −σ . In equilibrium,
n t (j)dj. Also, there is no price dispersion in a symmetric equilibrium with quadratic costs of price adjustment, so aggregate output equals aggregate labor effort, so Y t = N t .
6
The aggregate resource constraint is
where steady-state inflation is set to zero.
Optimal Discretionary Policy Under an Ad-hoc Loss
Optimal policy under discretion in a standard New Keynesian framework, such as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) , instructs policy to contract aggregate demand when inflation rises.
The extent of the response depends on two factors: the slope of the Phillips curve and the 6 That is, 
where λ is the relative weight on output deviations. The optimal discretionary policy takes private sector expectations as given and minimizes (18) subject to
The disturbance e t represents a transformed markup shock. Since the optimization problem is static, the central bank only needs to be concerned with setting policy based on the current state and disregards how the slope of the Phillips curve may change in the future.
Combing the first-order conditions for each state yields the optimal state-contingent targeting rules
for i = 1, 2. This set of targeting rules indicates that the central bank should optimally vary how aggressively it acts to offset aggregate supply disturbances depending on the slope of the Phillips curve. In states with relatively low costs of price adjustment, say in s t = 1, the Phillips curve is steep and implies that inflation is relatively responsive to changes in the output gap. In this case, the optimal targeting rule instructs policy to use this leverage and adjust the output gap more aggressively in response to inflation. So with κ 1 > κ 2 , the central bank adjusts aggregate demand more aggressively when s t = 1 than when s t = 2.
The Utility-Based Welfare Criterion
The ad-hoc loss function in squared deviations of the output gap and inflation from their steady-state values is a common specification and reflects the objectives of many central banks. Woodford (2003) shows how a second-order approximation to the expected utility of the consumer under the assumption of staggered price-setting, as in Calvo (1983) , gives rise to a loss function of the ad-hoc form. However, the weight on the output gap term is a function of the frequency of price adjustment, among other structural parameters. Eusepi (2005) derives the utility-based welfare function for price adjustment subject to quadratic costs, as in Rotemberg (1982) , and shows how the weight on the output gap term depends on the parameter governing the cost of price adjustment. In a setting where this cost can change, this section shows that the weight on the output gap also changes with the cost of price adjustment and how this affects the optimal policy under discretion.
The appendix derives the following period loss function from an approximation to the period utility function of the representative household
where Ω i = .5ϕ i scales the loss according to the cost of price adjustment and
indicating that the weight on output gap deviations depends on the state governing the cost of price adjustment. If the utility function has log consumption and is linear in labor, so σ = 1 and η = 0, then (22) is simply
In a state with a relatively low cost of price adjustment, deviations in inflation create a small loss, so the weight on the output gap is relatively high. Conversely, in a state with a high cost of price adjustment, deviations in inflation are costly, so the central bank should place less emphasis on output stabilization. This intuition is similar to that from the utility-based welfare criteria derived under the Calvo mechanism of price adjustment, as in Woodford (2003) . When the price adjustment is infrequent, losses arise from price dispersion, so the central bank should place low weight on output stabilization relative to the case when price adjustment occurs more frequently.
Minimizing the central bank's utility-based loss function subject to the Phillips curve under the assumption that policy actions do not affect private agents' expectations yields
or after substituting for λ i and κ i ,
indicating the central bank should not optimally vary how aggressively it acts to offset aggregate supply disturbances. The optimal targeting rule is a constant relation between output and inflation, independent of the state, and depends only upon the elasticity of substitution between goods. This result differs from the optimal discretionary policy under an ad-hoc loss, where the optimal discretionary policy instructs the central bank to switch policies in accordance with the slope of the Phillips curve.
In the state with relatively high costs of price adjustment, both the weight attached to output gap stabilization and the slope coefficient in the Phillips curve are relatively small.
Under an ad-hoc loss, a high cost of price adjustment (i.e. flat Phillips curve) directs policy to reduce the systematic output gap response to inflation deviations precisely because such movements are less effective at stabilizing inflation. However, inflation volatility is more costly to firms in states with high costs of price adjustment, an aspect that the ad-hoc loss function neglects. The utility-based welfare criterion captures this higher cost of inflation volatility by reducing the weight on output gap stabilization in the states with a high cost of price adjustment.
Thus, in the high-cost state, two opposing forces exactly offset to bring about the invariant policy response : 1) a lower slope of the Phillips curve, which directs policy to reduce output gap movements to stabilize inflation and 2) a lower weight on the output gap, which directs policy to increase output gap movements to stabilize inflation. 8 The difference in comparison to the optimal policy under the ad-hoc loss function is that it only accounts for the first factor, the change in the slope of the Phillips curve, and ignores the welfare implications of inflation in the different states.
Welfare Analysis
In this section, I compute the loss due to a central bank that sets policy to minimize the ad-hoc loss function instead of the utility-based metric. Clearly, loss arises if the weight on output gap deviations in the ad-hoc loss differs from the utility-based value. This weight, however, can align for one particular state, but a change in the slope of the Phillips curve will result in a welfare loss. To compute this loss, I derive the solutions for inflation and output using the targeting rules that minimize the ad-hoc loss function, then evaluate the welfare implications using the utility-based metric.
Using the method of undetermined coefficients on the minimum set of state variables, which are s t and e t , solutions under the ad-hoc loss have the form
for i = 1, 2. The appendix illustrates how to find the unknown state-contingent coefficients, a i for i = 1, 2, which have the following relationship to the structural parameters
In the case of i.i.d. shocks, solutions to (27) are
The utility-based metric implies that the average welfare loss for s t = i each period is
Let θ t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1), then recalling e t = ϕ −1 i θ t and substituting the solutions for inflation and the output gap into (28) yields
. However, the common ad-hoc specification holds λ constant, so
, which indicates that λ can maximize welfare in one state, but will result in a welfare loss when the slope of the Phillips curve changes.
For a quantitative illustration, I set σ = 1 and η = 0, which implies a utility function that has log consumption and is linear in labor, and take numerical estimates of the slope coefficients for the Phillips curve from Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . the Phillips curve steepens, the welfare decline is relatively modest.
Conclusion
This paper shows that a change in the cost of price adjustment can generate instability in a forward-looking Phillips curve relation. In particular, the coefficients on both expected inflation and marginal cost, or the output gap, are subject to change in coordination with changes in the state governing the cost of adjusting prices.
In addition, Phillips curve instability has implications for optimal monetary policy. Under an ad-hoc welfare criterion, the coefficient in the optimal targeting rule changes when the slope of the Phillips curve changes. However, since the microfoundations of the firm's optimization problem are made explicit, it is possible to derive a utility-based welfare metric. A novel feature of this metric is that it has a state-dependent weight on the output gap term. The weight depends inversely on the cost of price adjustment, so in the low cost state, relatively more weight is placed on output stabilization. The implication for optimal monetary policy under discretion is that the optimal targeting rule should not vary the systematic component of policy, standing in contrast to the prescription coming from the ad-hoc criterion.
APPENDIX A. Deriving the Phillips Curve Under Changing Costs of Price Adjustment
For s t = 1, the conditional first-order condition after distributing the ϕ(s t+1 ) term is
where P t+1 (i, j) represents the nominal price for firm j when s t+1 = i and Y t+1 (i) represents final output when s t+1 = i. An analogous first-order condition exists for s t = 2, except p 11 is replaced with (1 − p 22 ) and (1 − p 11 ) is replaced with p 22 . Using (A − 1), the firm's optimal pricing condition for s t = 1, after imposing P t (j) = P t , is given by
where substituting in
Log-linearizing around the constant steady state yields
, and θ t = log (θ t /θ) . Values without a time subscript are steady-state values. Eliminating higher-order terms and using
The same approach is taken for s t = 2, where the general representation can be rewritten as (12).
B. Deriving the Utility-Based Welfare Criterion
If prices are fully flexible, then monopolistic firms set prices using
where in a symmetric equilibrium
Substituting this expression into (15) and using Y t = C t = H t gives
where (1 + ν) μ −1 = 1 by construction, where then solving for the steady-state yields the efficient steady-state level for production of Y * = 1. Under the labor subsidy, monetary policy focuses on stabilization policies, versus policies to undo the monopolistic distortion.
Also, in the steady state, the monopolistic firm is not adjusting its price, so the changing parameter governing the costs of price adjustment does not create any distortions.
Substituting (17) into (13) yields
The second-order approximation to the first term of the representative agent's period utility function is given by 
